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Abstract This paper offers a critique of transnational aspects of ‘inclusion,’ 
one of those global education buzzwords that as Slee (2009) puts it, say eve-
rything but say nothing. It starts off by trying to compare Indian and English 
usages and attitudes at the level of teacher discourse, and notes the impos-
sibility of any ‘authentic’ translation, given the very different cultural contexts 
and histories. In response to these divergences, the authors undertake a much 
more genealogical and ‘forensic’ examination of values associated with ‘inclu-
sion,’ focussing especially on a key notion of ‘pity.’ The Eurocentric tradition is 
traced from its Platonic origins through what is claimed to be the ‘industriali-
zation of pity’ and its rejection as a virtue in favour of more apparently egali-
tarian measures of fairness. The Indian tradition relates rather to religious tra-
ditions across a number of different belief systems, most of which centre on 
some version of a karmic notion of pity. The authors both criticise and reject 
‘inclusion’ as a colonisation of the global and call for a new understanding of 
notions like ‘pity’ as affective commitment rather than ‘fair’ dispensation of 
equality.
Dead Ends
This article begins with a dead end. Recently, whilst engaged in research in India 
and England, we gathered data from a series of semi-structured interviews of teach-
ers involved in Special Needs education. Our aim was to compare how inclusion was 
defined and operationalised by teachers. The definitions offered and experiences re-
counted within the interviews were problematic there seemed little commonalty and 
many glaring differences. The initial methodology was a comparative ‘grounded theo-
ry’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). By grounding analysis researchers 
seek to empower participants’ voices enabling them to ‘speak’ within academic papers. 
But the harder we tried to represent, define, analyse and compare, the more slippery 
the words became. The dilemma was that such an analysis involves codifying words 
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based upon agency and action. This process relies upon personal interpretation and 
inherited context. Yet contexts dominated common meaning. Our aim, of course, was 
to ‘find’ [never an innocent intention] concepts that would work across contexts but 
the harder we tried to go across the data, the more we were forced down in both cul-
tures1 not in order to ‘discover’ (at last) commonalities but to unearth (not ‘ground’) 
differences in meaning, value, history, philosophy and religion that the discourse of 
‘inclusion’ disregarded, or even suppressed. The method fell apart along with its root 
metaphors. That was our first dead end.
The more we considered the data the greater became the issue of interpretation-
in-context rather than any search for ‘rubies in the porridge.’ Dialogue between the two 
national contexts suggested that each word had a heritage grounded within years or 
even centuries of interpretation, semantic shifts and sometimes cynical manipulations 
of meaning. We needed a more forensic approach, both to the surfaces of the rhetorics 
of inclusion, and the cultural ‘depths’ of each word and context. Words had histo-
ries much more importantly than they had definitions. In a quite different sense, such 
words had ‘dead ends’ that had become neglected or obscured, yet which were cultur-
ally significant-offering hidden ontologies and values that the surface rhetorics of the 
interview data obscured. This issue became the root of our initial dismay. The words 
that took us furthest into this underworld were those of ‘pity’ and ‘compassion.’ Pity, in 
western culture is locked into a negative discourse. It is a clarion call to those who are 
bound up with political correctness. It is a word thou shalt not mention in relation to 
disability. The transcripts, however, revealed that the India teachers did conceptualise 
pity in this manner, in fact they seem to celebrate it. So began our journey of discovery 
and enlightenment.
Before entering that underworld, however, it is worth saying something about 
global discourses of inclusion. De Novoa (2002) has written perceptively about EU 
discourses that in order to achieve a non-threatening universalism have to rise to a 
level of abstraction that make them anondyne or even largely meaningless. We would 
argue that the inclusion agenda of Salamanca has some of these problems (Armstrong, 
et al.; 2005; Dunne, 2009). From the Salamanca Statement onwards, the term inclu-
sion has also become part of governmental rhetoric in India and has gained status not 
just within individual schools but also in the mass media and in government policies 
(Singal & Rouse, 2003; Singal, 2005). It is evident, however, that inclusion suffers from 
what Singal (2005) calls terminological ambiguity because ‘inclusion’ is not an indig-
enous concept but results from western influences upon special education. Hindi, for 
example, has no direct translation for the term ‘inclusion’ (Singal, 2006). Secondly, ‘in-
clusion’ itself—certainly in its UK manifestation—is not an uncomplicated ideological 
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construct since it has been accompanied by policies that have exacerbated (especially 
but not only) socio-economic differences, and can be read as a ‘cloak’ rather than a 
promise (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007).2 As they put it, in relation to another Euro-
pean context, “Exclusion ignores exploitation” (Boltanski & Chiapello, p.354). It is not 
a unitary construct to be read in political isolation. In England, the past thirty years 
have seen a change in special education in respect to the development of inclusive 
educational practice (Hodkinson, 2005; 2009). In 1997, a New Labour government 
swept to power on such rhetoric. However, whilst the literature leaves one in no doubt 
that inclusion has gained prominence, it also suggests a tension in how inclusion is 
defined and regarding the words that are acceptable in its associated discourse (Hod-
kinson, 2009). As Boltanski & Chiapello argue it, notions of ‘class’ stand in the same 
relation to ‘exploitation’ as ‘network’ does to ‘exclusion.’ Thirdly, acts of ‘policy borrow-
ing’ are common in the global educational field and reflect a kind of implicit hierarchy 
of worth-the shadow of a cultural imperialism is never far away. The overall effect has 
recently been characterised by Rizvi & Lingard as follows: 
These effects worked through what has been called a ‘magistrature of influence’ 
operating above these nations, and have ensured some policy convergence as a 
result of this form of global governance, which was also part of the move of gov-
ernment to government within these particular nations (2010, p.123). 
This paper focuses on the genealogy of the words pity and compassion3 and their 
relationship to disability and inclusion. We are interested here in acts of translation 
that always somehow fail, and thus provoke a never ending ‘reform’ of the discourse 
rather than the practices or values it implies. Especially, we are interested in what 
Hughes called a ‘  . . . linguistic Lourdes” (Hughes, 1993, cited in Cameron, 1994, p.24) 
where words are taken to be finally and perhaps magically cured. To facilitate this ex-
amination we begin by briefly exploring discourses of inclusion employed by teachers 
in England and India. 
Definitions of inclusion: a singularly western tradition?
Within the data the English teachers’ definitions of inclusion were based upon a num-
ber of themes; these being that every child should have same opportunity to access the 
mainstream educational environment and be educated using the same curriculum. 
For example, one teacher said ‘inclusive education is  . . . including all students that are 
in a learning environment in the experience and making sure that they get the best 
out of that experience as is possible. Another teacher detailed inclusion as ensuring 
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that all children ‘should be taught in mainstream’ and have ‘access and participation.’ 
Such teachers, in the main, believed that inclusive education referred to children who 
had Special Educational Needs (SEN) and/or disabilities. However, it was noticeable 
that the Indian teachers constructed their understandings of inclusion in wider terms 
using the words ‘pity’ or ‘compassion.’ For example, “Yes, basically as a teacher I feel 
the biggest asset should be compassion . . .  so I’m very compassionate and I have that 
feature in me. I feel that I’m actually compassionate towards him and I like to think I 
have learnt that.”
Several other references linked disability to pity for the child and his or her condi-
tion, requiring schools to respond to such emotions. A focus on pity is not unique to 
our research, as indeed other Indian researches commonly reference pity (Dalal, n.d; 
Tull 1989; Miles, 2002). Of interest to us then was why such disparity in the accept-
ability of pity? Initial discussion suggested this might be because pity in relation to 
these issues is observed to be ‘politically incorrect.’ Indeed, it is a word that causes re-
sentment and anger within the Western disability fraternity. Western culture it seems 
has encouraged practitioners to view pity as negative. Indeed disability ‘blogs’ and 
academic papers within journals evidence this, Pity in and of itself  . . . , is a negative, 
period. I don’t even want to add a noun there  . . . it blocks not only a dialogue  . . . but 
can become the reason for objectifying and pushing away a disabled person  . . .  (Dis-
ability Blog) Overall, many students  . . . related some negative feelings about people 
with disabilities  . . . [within their journals] Some students expressed feelings such as 
pity and sympathy  . . . One student was clearly struggling with what she was really feel-
ing  . . . and what she thought she should be feeling I can’t help but stare at her and feel 
ashamed to do this. I feel pity, I feel sorry for her and I am also ashamed of this attitude 
I maintain. (Carrington and Brownlee, 2001, p.349) The message in Western disability 
literature then is that pity is a negative emotion, one we should avoid and reprimand 
when interacting with people with impairments. 
We argued earlier that ‘un-grounded theory’ necessitates forensic examination of 
individual words, and mindful of this we now ‘incise’ the word that precipitated our 
crisis of confidence in the application of our analytical techniques. This analysis con-
siders how and why the employment of the word pity is so distinct within western and 
Indian parlance. Our analysis sketches the earliest definitions, emotions, and usages of 
this word. If, as we promised earlier, we are to go all the way down, rather than across, 
then we need to start with the European tradition on ‘pity’ as first proposed by Plato 
and Aristotle. 
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Western Philosophical Discourses of Pity 
ancient greco-roman traditions of pity
Plato regards pity as a basic desire analogous to friendship, hunger and lechery (Pap-
pas, 1994). Platonic belief is suspicious of immersing oneself in this emotion, lest it 
make us “ . . . soft, passive and less likely to act well” (Felski, 2008, p. 155). Steven (1942, 
p. 11) argues that for Plato pity is apocryphal and pernicious, the “ . . . stimulation of 
which is likely to fit a man for meeting his share of misfortune courageously”. Never-
theless, Halliwell (2002, p. 278) notes that Plato believes pity is central to existence 
because it “ . . . contribute[s] to the reshaping of one’s own sense of moral identity”. 
Rather than dismissing pity he calls for it to be bestowed upon himself. Rather like 
in the ‘gentle rain’ image in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice. Pity, in such a reading, 
is desirable but if unrestrained by reason its effect on society is pernicious allowing 
desire, not reason, to control man’s thoughts.
Aristotle also believes that pity is a basic response, one which addresses suffer-
ing. For Aristotle there are three motivations to pity; first, there is an awareness that 
a person’s suffering is significant; second, that the suffering is undeserved and, third, 
that such suffering could happen to oneself. (Portman, 2000). Aristotle regards such 
pity as positive for without it we cannot experience catharsis, a “  . . . purging of one’s 
own natural orientation” (Campbell, 2004, p. 275). Unlike the modern concept of pity, 
Aristotle would not depict pity as a “ . . . condescending feeling of sorrow for someone 
who is radically inferior” (Kenston, 2001, p. 181).
Thus far, we can see that ‘pity’ stands at some distance from its contemporary dis-
paragement in (or rather) out of ‘Western’ inclusion rhetorics.4 It is not condescension, 
and it is a necessary emotion that we might wish for ourselves as for others, though 
with the Platonic proviso that it be tempered both with reason and resolution. 
discourses of pity: the enlightenment
Before the Enlightenment pity was subject to further analysis by western philosophers, 
notably Hobbes. For Hobbes, pity is indivisible from compassion (Ewin, 2001) and is, 
as for Plato and Aristotle, a basic desire (Halliwell, 2002). Hobbes comments, “ . . . Men 
are apt to pity those whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not 
worthy of calamity”. For Hobbes, not to immerse oneself in these feelings showed a 
“ . . . hardness of heart “ which proceeded from a “ . . . slowness of the imagination . . 
.” (Leviathan, c9. s.10). In Leviathan (c6, s27-27) Hobbes notes that, “Griefe for the 
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calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagination that the calamity may 
befall him selfe and therefore is also called compassion and in the phrase of the present 
time FELLOW-FEELING.” It would seem that whilst Hobbes and Aristotle equate pity 
with apprehension (of a similar fate), the premise of ‘feeling with’ is not privileged but 
is more driven by psychological egoism grounded within fear that such calamity might 
befall ourselves (Hampton, 1988). 
With the Enlightenment, such a view of Man5 needing to be saved from himself/
herself is reversed: it is ‘Society’ that we have to fear. In Discourses of Inequality, Rous-
seau’s argues that ‘natural’ man has only two desires; self-preservation and pity, and 
holds these to be two sides of the same coin, with self-preservation ensuring individual 
survival and pity the species (Manent & Le Dain, 2001). Pity, he argues is therefore a 
catalyst for natural justice because by experiencing it one cannot wish harm to another 
(Manent & Dain, 2001). Rousseau comments (1984, p.101), It is therefore very certain 
that pity is a natural sentiment which by moderating in each individual the activity 
of self-love, contributes to the mutual preservation of the whole species.  Pity from 
Rousseau’s perspective is the root of an emotion without which mankind “  . . . despite 
all their morality, would have been no better than monsters . . .” (Rousseau, p. 101). 
For Rousseau, pity is positive, drawing fellow men together. Rousseau’s thesis is that 
inequality stems from a dilution of pity and the elevation of self-preservation. He com-
ments, “As society develops one would see the rights of the citizens and the freedoms 
of notions extinguished little by little, and the protest of the weak treated as seditious 
noise.” (Rousseau, p.1 33)
For Rousseau, then, pity is a social value to be cultivated to overcome isolation, 
separation and the individualisation of its members (Boyd, 2004). Of interest to the 
development of our overall argument was the suggestion that to overcome inequality 
we should cultivate pity. One is left in no doubt that pity as articulated by Rousseau 
is radically different to that within modern western discourses of disability. Rousseau 
would certainly reject the contemporary ‘inclusive’ rhetorics that would disparage pity 
as condescension. Moreover, he would conclude that an equality unreliant on pity was 
improbably lacking in affect and commitment. Why, then, did ‘Western’ views move 
from such a positive outlook on pity to the negative conceptualisation of today? What 
was the nature of that displacement?
pity: descent into negativity and the industrialisation of pity
Pity becomes a negative emotion in industrializing Europe. As the Foucault of Birth 
of the Clinic, and Madness and civilisation illustrated, breaks in the episteme result in 
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radical shifts in the medical and educational ‘gaze’ (Foucault, 2001). The perspective 
that had foregrounded ‘pity’ was, in the tradition of Rousseau, backward-looking and 
romantic. A new medical and scientific positivism was more inclined to a Hobbesian 
pessimism. Objectification of ‘condition’(diagnosis, treatment, morality) and meth-
odology (medical, statistical, normative) created social paradigms which correlated 
disability to helplessness and dependency. The new perspectives held an element of 
mimicry in that industrial innovation and associated changes both enforced and mod-
elled new ways of thinking about individuals and society—there is always something of 
a ‘cargo cult’ going on in circumstances of change (See Jones & Grant in this edition). 
The positive valency of notions like ‘pity’ and ‘charity’ declined, and a more negative 
assumption of inequality developed, whereby the superior felt ‘pity’ for the inferior. 
Pity as condescension was born. 
That argument can be extended. Basically, equality is associated with 19th century 
developments in affect. It comes both to replace and deprecate ideas such as ‘pity’ and 
‘charity’– neither of these words begin to carry their current class/status connotations 
until the notion of a quasi-measured ‘equality’ invests both ‘scientific socialism’ and its 
softer relations in social democracy. The word ‘equal’ belongs implicitly to an economy 
of ‘similar’ and ‘different’ that have to be ‘equated.’ But such an equation is tantamount 
to an ‘industrialisation of pity.’ It offers an implicit quantification that argues itself as 
necessarily in need of a continual ‘balancing’ and ‘equating’ in order to decide itself to 
be true to its principles of equal treatment and fairness. This is impossible, along the 
lines of Colebrook’s ‘bourgeois thermodynamics’ (Colebrook, 2008) that fairness and 
excision of prejudice can never be realized. It is always breaking down as a resolution; 
failure to ‘equate’ is thus built into the discourse and as a result discourses of racial, 
sexual and ethnic identity, disability etc and fairness are forever inventing new con-
cepts as the old discourse fails to deliver (as the procession of ephemerally ‘correct’ 
terms for disability or race would indicate). Hence fads and fashions like ‘inclusion’ 
etc. We do not argue that such a semantic kind of problem is anything like all of the 
problem, but if you go over the ways in which arguments are finally worked out in 
terms of equal dignity, equal respect, fine balancing point something of the implicitly 
calculative nature of the underlying concepts and metaphors can be seen. The bigger 
argument is that two of the Big Three of the French revolution have been worked over 
and over—liberty and equality.6 But we haven’t done nearly enough thinking about 
‘fraternity’ (if it can be forgiven its previously male origin as a word). Such a term 
takes us back towards earlier notions of pity, compassion and ‘fellow-feeling’ because it 
emphasizes the affect and the relationship in terms of an affective commitment rather 
than a rational calculation. So perhaps we need different approaches to thinking no-
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tions of ‘association’ and ‘mitsein’ (Heidegger’s term, but he doesn’t develop it)—and 
Jean-Luc Nancy in the Experience of Freedom tries to do just that. 
To support these lines of argument we pursue three distinct but overlapping ge-
nealogies, within the development of the medical profession, notions of charity and 
the image of disability created by populist media. It is through what we would call 
these ‘centres of osmosis,’ that industrial capitalism created a social hegemony found-
ed upon the “ . . . normality of the able-bodied” (Barnes & Mercer, 2003, p.26). New 
“ . . . yardstick[s] for judging people with impairments” emerged (Barnes & Mercer, 
2003, p. 21), mixed from a cocktail of medical and scientific positivism, benevolent hu-
manitarianism and a dose of Methodism and Evangelicalism (Pritchard, 1963). These 
changed societal consciousness of impairment and thus transformed pity into “an urge 
begotten of a superfluity of power” (Nietzsche, 1990, p. 91).
disability, pity and the medical model
The discourses of Victorian medical empiricism and scientific positivism subverted 
conceptions of pity. Industrialisation, through its massification, led to new medical 
approaches as professionals became increasingly concerned with normality and the 
desires to diagnose, categorise and cure impairments. The adoption of what Priestly 
(1998) calls individual materialism enabled disability to be considered in terms of bio-
logical determinism, a personal tragedy located within the material condition of the 
patient. Foucault (1977, p. 134) argues that the object was “  . . . docile bodies” that were 
“ . . . used, transformed and improved” to serve the needs of industry. We believe this 
model is significant to conceptions of pity as it elevated medical and quasi-medical 
professionals to positions of superiority. Patients, then, who failed to measure up to 
social norms, who could not be transformed by medical ‘science’ were therefore rel-
egated to inferior positions as part of a social technology rather than addressed by 
any discourse of pity or compassion. We are minded here of Ben-Ze’ev’s contention 
(1993) that professionals through the medical model adopt a position of ‘sympathetic 
sorrow’ towards disability and this is transposed onto patients in the form of the new 
definitions of pity.7 
We suggest this new disability-pity relationship coupled with a changing profes-
sional power dynamic enables the ‘science’ of social Darwinism and eugenics to spread 
across western society. Pity, then, rather than acting as a counterbalance to self-preser-
vation, becomes unbalanced and disability (etc) becomes a matter of ‘science,’ as Dar-
win’s (1874, p.157) eugenicist comments confirm, 
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We civilised men  . . . do our utmost to check the process of elimination: we build 
asylums for the imbecile, the maimed and, the sick, we institute poor-laws, and 
our medical men exert their utmost to save the life of everyone to the last mo-
ment  . . .  Thus the weak members of society propagate their kind. No-one who 
has attended to the breeding of domestic animals will doubt that this must be 
highly injurious to the race of men. 
It was philanthropy as well as science that engendered new responses to abnor-
mality and misfortune (Hodkinson, 2007). First, state education developed “ . . . to pro-
vide skilled workers who could compete in an era of growing industrial productivity” 
(Wood, 2004, p. 11). For those ejected from mainstream schooling the issue became 
one of charitable8 accommodation. Philanthropy maintained the special segregated 
schooling and workhouses prevalent in Victorian Britain. This humanitarianism 
mixed with repression and control reinforces the pity-disability dynamic by offer-
ing an “ . . . enduring cultural message that perpetuates an image of helplessness and 
dependency” (Barnes & Mercer, 2003, p. 26) and thus creates a “ . . . morally asym-
metrical relationship” (Bickenbach, 1993, p. 197), casting some as active agents and 
others as passive recipients (Williams, 1986). Charities fed this dynamic, constructing 
an image of disability as personal tragedy with the aim of stimulating emotional reac-
tions (Shakespeare, 2006). Pity had been a ‘gift’ in the past. Now it was much more a 
commodity, an affect to be stimulated and marketed. It is in such contexts we suggest 
pity evolves towards Nietzsche’s mitleid and so becomes based upon superiority and 
intense feelings that the subject of pity is worthless. As such it becomes a ‘moral shud-
der’ whose employment offers contempt as pity becomes contaminated with shame.9 
The third site of osmosis in generating the new pity-disability nexus was the me-
dia, and it was crucial to the dissemination of pity as a negative emotion. Over the last 
two centuries classic plays, story books and newspapers have presented people with 
impairments as pathetic, pitiable and passive victims (Hodkinson, 2007). For example, 
the very first melodrama performed in 1802 employed a mute character whose role 
was to “ . . . evoke great pity” in the audience (Booth, 1965, p. 71). Dickens’ novels pur-
veyed the image of disability as grounded within the emotions of pity and braver.10 It is 
our contention, then, that the media also helped displace pity from a positive concept 
to a negative one. The media ensured that pity became an attitude stimulus (Shake-
speare, 2006) which served to mediate our attitudes towards, assumptions about and 
expectations of people with impairments.
Thus elements of the economic, medical, philanthropic, literary and media dis-
courses and practices generated what we want to call the ‘industrialization of pity’ and 
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its re-location as a social technology rather than a moral or religious commitment. As 
such it was inflected by the normative ‘scientific’11 concerns of the 19th century in such 
a way that it became what it remains today, largely at least, an implicit quantification, 
based on notions of ‘equality’ rather than ‘pity’ or compassion.
Indian philosophy, tradition and ethics
Earlier we detailed our analytic deadend. If we could not compare like with like then 
we would have to learn to contrast unlike with unlike, and take it from there. It became 
evident to both of us that to have any chance of making sense of this difference we had 
to understand not only the Indian teachers’ ‘cultural beliefs and coping mechanisms’ 
(Dalal, n.d., p.4) but also to develop a better understanding of the Indian political and 
cultural beliefs and values that surrounded the reception of ‘inclusion’ rhetorics.
Again, we intend this analysis to centre on notions of pity and compassion. The 
first thing that had to be acknowledged was that 70% of the world’s disability is located 
in countries where up until very recently western philosophical traditions and ethics 
had little influence (Miles, 2002). Inclusion, by definition, was related to such tradition. 
From that perspective ‘inclusion’ was a highly exclusionary cultural act. It was clear 
to us that to understand the lexicon, agency and actions of the teachers in our Indian 
data we had to acknowledge the Eurocentric neglect of Indian beliefs and attitudes 
that has characterised transnational discourses of inclusion (Miles, 2002). In our re-
analysis of the data, we agreed with Miles (2002, p. 54) that “ . . . in the pluralistic and 
post-modern age the existence of concepts and belief systems that differ radically from 
those contextualised in western debate cannot be ignored”. We came to realise that 
to understand why pity and compassion were understood positively we had to make 
sense of the “ . . . socio-cultural logic” (Miles, 2002, p. 68) that was operating in the In-
dian contexts. A further difficulty was, as Dalal (n.d., p. 4) recalled, “ . . . Indian society 
has remained pluralistic with multiple traditions weaving multicultural patterns and 
therefore needs to be understood as embedded into multiple cultural discourses with 
subtle nuances” . Accordingly, we examined various aspects of Indian life, its religion, 
engrained traditions of ‘charity in the form of deed,’ and its strong sense of community. 
We believed that it is within these ‘subtle nuances’ of Indian society the reason for the 
positive orientation of pity might be found.
Although one may argue that India is constructed within uniquely conflicted and 
conflicting sub-cultures there is a commonality of attitudes in that for thousands of 
years India has projected a sense of community based upon practices of helping oth-
ers. This community spirit has been based on strong religious traditions which have, 
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and indeed still do, dominate much of Indian life (Jha, 2002). Overall, we found our-
selves drawn to Jha’s (2002, p. 43) contention that “ . . . religious beliefs . . .  seem to pro-
vide important explanations”. We believed that this principle opened up a new ontol-
ogy for locating the interview transcripts.
india and its religions
Within India a number of religions exist, such as Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Hindu-
ism, Islam and Christianity. Hinduism is considered the world’s oldest religion and 
accounts for some 80% of Indian devotees. As our understanding developed it became 
apparent that many assumptions, beliefs and attitudes that are rooted in present In-
dian cultures seem to be formulated with reference to Hindu mythology, classic Vedic 
epics and other religious texts. For thousands of years classic texts of Hinduism have 
referred to disability and employed disabled characters many of which are still familiar 
(Miles, 2002). For example, one of the ten Dasavataram (reincarnation of Lord Vishnu 
in various forms on Earth) refers to Vishnu’s appearance as a dwarf and in the Jataka 
tales the Buddha appears as a gifted dwarf and as a ‘deaf cripple’ (Miles, 2002). These 
religious stories are repeatedly told through a variety of media; books, films, and car-
toons to reinforce values related to charity, pity and compassion.12 There are some 
interesting contrasts here, not least in the incorporation of disability into the god him-
self, in perhaps telling contrast to a Christian ethic where the disabled are the Other 
that the perfect god (e.g., Jesus) must heal.
In classic Buddhist texts monks and lay disciples are urged to “Go ye now and 
wander for the gain of many, for the welfare of the gods and man” (Widgery, 2006, 
p.57) and never “ . . . cease to preach and to practice universal pity and sympathy for 
sentient life”. Traditional Muslim culture is more ambivalent about ‘pity,’ believing that 
all needs are met not out of pity but as a gesture of seeking good will to God. There 
is no doubt, however, that a major ‘attitudinal stimulus’ in India is as Miles (2002, p. 
57) states, that “ . . . adherents of most religions are exhorted not to mock or obstruct 
disabled people but to be charitable to them.” What was most revealing to us was that 
in the fourth Century BCE Chandragupta Maurya formulated a law that forbade the 
employment of discriminatory language towards people with disabilities. Therefore, it 
was in India that the notion of anti-discriminatory legislation began.
A prominent concept in Indian society is ‘charity of deed.’13 Indeed, all major In-
dian religions recommend charity; in Islam as Zakat, in Christianity as Tithe and in 
Hinduism as Daan. Moreover, ‘charity of deed’ is enshrined within the ancient Vedic 
principle of Dharma, which offers charity and service as a duty to all people includ-
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ing the destitute, disabled and the less fortunate members of society (Agarwall, 1994). 
Tradition, then, enjoins fortunate people to show pity and compassion to those who 
suffer. We concluded that various forms of ‘inclusion’ had been operating for many 
thousands of years and indeed that it may be considered as part of the social glue that 
held Indian society together.14
Given such cultural and religious contexts, why, despite all of the economic and 
technological changes that had influenced the global community, had these various 
conceptualisations of ‘pity’ and similar obligations not altered in India?
the karmic tradition
Karma, according to Birckenbach (1992, p. 189) is a theory of “ . . . primitive retributiv-
ism”. Winthrop (1963, p. 189) notes that karma involves a person in “ . . . conscious act 
and volitional action” which produces either pleasure (sukha) or pain and suffering 
(duhka). For Winthrop (1963) karma is essentially a merit and demerit system that 
develops its potential within a person’s jiva. The jiva in Hindu tradition is carried from 
one birth to the next. As such if one has committed misdeeds in a previous life one has 
to bear the consequences in present existence (Dalal, n.d.). To overcome these previ-
ous misdeeds one has to behave morally (Doniger & O Flaherty, 1983). In the develop-
ment of our thinking the principle of karma became most important. We now want to 
argue that the philosophy of karma gives rise to the manifestation of pity, and it is this 
pity that leads to benevolent acts of charity.
But there is a conundrum here. How could such ancient traditions, mythologies 
and religious duties still provide such attitudinal stimulus in such a technologically 
innovative modern society? We earlier argued for the notion of the ‘industrialisation 
of pity’ in Europe, resulting in quasi-quantified notions of ‘equality’ and ‘entitlement. 
In the Indian contexts, we found no equivalent except at the level of the somewhat 
‘gaseous’ global discourses of disability. In stark distinction, we argue here that it may 
not be what the industrial revolution did, but what it failed to achieve in India that 
brings us closer to understanding the manifestations of pity and compassion observed 
in our study.
Our understanding of the importance of Indian industrialisation was developed 
by the work of Usha Bhatt (1963) who by employing analytical references from ancient 
scriptures examined how attitudes towards disability were changing within Indian so-
ciety as a result of industrialisation. Earlier, we proposed that industrialisation enabled 
scientific positivism and biomedical ethics to ‘hitch-hike’ on the “ . . . grand narrative 
of western civilization” and so insinuate themselves as “ . . . illegal immigrants” in the 
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project of a new colonial global modernity (Menon, 1997, p. 291). Bhatt argues that 
such incursions were very limited in impact because India’s strong sense of commu-
nity coupled with the peripheral impact of the industrial revolution on its rural hinter-
lands meant that, unlike in Europe, there was much less destruction of the familial unit 
in India. Dalal (n.d.) adds to Bhatt’s thesis, suggesting that whilst industrialisation and 
two world wars deeply influenced societal attitudes in the West the same was simply 
not the case in India.
Thus we conclude that pity and compassion grounded in karmic principles served 
to limit the impact of scientific positivism and biomedical discourses. We suggest that 
Karma acting in line with Rousseau-like principles of pity and compassion acted as 
a counterbalance to the ‘vanity, cruelty and inequality’ inherent in these new indus-
trialised societies. We believe therefore that the Indian teachers’ operationalisation 
of pity and compassion in our study was more plausibly a social construct based on 
karmic principles. As a result, the ‘inclusion’ agenda, with its notions of equality rather 
than compassion, of calculation rather than concern, is subverted rather than rejected.
Conclusions
We began with a dead end. We end with a new beginning. By rejecting inherited 
cultural imperialism we began to entertain an anthropology of disability outside the 
dominant culture of western educated classes (Dalal, n.d.) so opening up new under-
standing. We suggest that if we are to avoid the pathological application of global edu-
cational discourses and policy the acceptance of globalised words such as inclusion 
must be questioned. The global discourse of ‘inclusion’ seeks to denigrate notions of 
‘pity’ in the Indian context. They are posited as a kind of ‘backwardness,’ a lack of dis-
cursive ‘political correctness’ which the new ideology will correct. In this account we 
have made two counter-suggestions. The first is that Indian discourses of pity, resting 
for example on karmic principles, may be in no need of such kinds of external instruc-
tion. The second is that western discourses on inclusion carry a very similar excision of 
past concern for ‘fellow-feeling’ expressed in terms of pity and compassion. We need 
to reconsider our own histories of care and concern for the Other. It is essentially a 
question of dialogue with the Other, and we have tried to enact something of that kind 
of dialogue in this paper. On both sides, for both parties, neither surrender nor imposi-
tion. Beyond that, we need to deconstruct notions of ‘equality’ and to de-industrialise 
the anathema pronounced on ‘pity’ and other notions like ‘charity.’ In particular, no-
tions associated with inclusion seem to imply a kind of hidden quantification—once 
again, we need ‘more history and less Maths’(See Stronach & Clarke this edition). In 
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Indian and in pre-industrial Europe these were not emotions of condescension, and it 
could be argued that they imply a kind of ‘associationism,’ ‘fraternity,’ and ‘fellow-feel-
ing’ that concepts of equality lack, or downplay. By its very nature such fraternity is an 
affective engagement, in ways that ‘equality’ may often lack in its concern to quantify 
and commodify fairness. We find ourselves thinking of new expeditions against other 
universalised educational terms such as ‘standards,’ ‘quality’ and ‘effectiveness.’ Within 
the global rubric of such ‘gaseous transnational discourses’ (de Novoa, 2002) it ought 
to be obvious that forcing global ‘reform’ discourses upon indigenous cultures without 
first understanding the individual society’s heritage serves only to confuse and mystify. 
Equally, the genealogy of these ‘reform discourses’ needs to be open to deconstruction 
and critique. Perhaps, then, what is required is much more of a form of “ . . . critical 
traditionalism” (Menon, 1997, p. 88) where global discourses are interrogated through 
the lens of a society’s heritage before being carried out to villages and towns as a grass 
roots movement.
A final point. The economic flows from ‘The West’ to India were mainly in one 
direction. That direction has now been reversed, for both India and China. It may be 
that other flows will also reverse, in a cultural and spiritual ‘El Niño’ effect. Such, at 
least, was the prediction of 
Schopenhauer (in Elman, 1983, p. 671) in relation to India,
In India our religions will never take root. The ancient wisdom of the human 
race will not be displaced by what happened in Galilee. On the contrary, Indian 
philosophy streams back to Europe, and will produce a fundamental change in 
our knowledge and thought. 
notes
 1. A dreadful conflation of cultural pluralities, especially in relation to India, but we will make 
a more complex distinction later in this account.
 2. This has more than one dimension. ‘Inclusion’ in the UK masks greater differentiation in 
other educational policies of New Labour, acting as a kind of Old Labour conscience to a 
more market-oriented and neoliberal agenda. It obscures the son-of-Thatcher nature of a 
Blairite agenda. It also masks disinvestments in specialized schooling for the disabled. 
 3. For some (Levine, 1986, p. 186) pity and compassion are actually two ends of the same 
continuum. The etymology of the word suggests that compassion is about tapping into 
somebody else’s feelings or feeling with’ another person (Kimball, 2004) (see further discus-
sion below). Others though argue that what most people call compassion is actually pity 
by another name (Blum, 1994). Indeed, one is minded of Nietzsche’s writings where he 
employs only one word that of Mitleid to represent compassion and pity. Some have argued 
therefore that he does not distinguish between these two concepts (Fraser, 2006). Others, 
though, (Portman, 2000) suggest that Mitleid is a principally negative concept for Nietzsche 
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but not wholly so as he distinguishes between pity and compassion in a somewhat ambi-
guous fashion.
 4. ‘Western,’ we recognize, has its own inclusionary/exclusionary issues. We use it as a short-
hand for those eurocentric and anglo-american countries who traditionally have dominated 
global education.
 5. We use the terminology of the period, while noting the ‘exclusive’ nature of its functioning 
in relation to gender.
 6. Indeed, English, British and American colonists were somewhat shameless in their invo-
cations of liberty, which always applied to the Self and seldom to the Other. Anglo-Saxon 
nostalgia for ancient liberties, combined with reverence for English Common Law, and 
opposition to Hanoverian despotism found little problem in by-passing contradictions as 
colossal as slavery (Schama, 2009, p. 45), although these invocations also informed the anti-
slavery movement in Britain.
 7. Hulme (1924) also adds that pity in this form is also confused with compassion, empathy, 
commiseration and condolence. 
 8. We do not develop the argument here, but ‘charity’ and ‘pity’ suffered very similar genealo-
gical fates.
 9. Nietzsche’s (1990) and the modern conceptualisation of pity are eminently demonstrated in 
this quote taken from this Victorian melodrama,
 “ . . . when I knelt, and held out my hand to ask for alms in the name of misfortune  . . . , 
shame choked my utterance and I was overcome with anger at my own humiliation. A 
passer-by looked at me in pity and put a  . . . coin in my hand. A great lump came into 
my throat and my eyes filled up with tears .”(Oxenford ,1874, p. 7). 
 10. Note, for example, Stothers’s (2008) critique of the character of Tiny Tim in a Christmas 
Carol. 
“Tiny Tim is on the ropes in Charles Dickens’ Christmas Carol. Sickly and dependent, 
Tiny Tim is getting shakier and shakier on that homemade little crutch. But he is saved 
from death by old Ebenezer Scrooge, who sees the light in the nick of time. Now, before 
you go apoplectic at my assault on wee Tim, think about how he helps shape some of 
society’s most cherished attitudes-charity, pity (for poor little Tiny Tim), for example. 
Tiny Tim, plucky, sweet and inspirational, tugs at the public heart . . . I hate it. I hate it 
because this Tiny Tim sentimentality stereotypes people with disabilities and contrib-
utes to our oppression.” 
 11. We do not at all want to disparage the workings of Science and Engineering in 19th and 
20th century Europe. It was ‘Science’ as social technology that concerns us, as a simulacra.
 12. Other ancient texts such as the Laws of Manu, purported to be the oldest legal code in the 
world and a basic text for all in the second century AD, established how families should 
maintain disabled relatives (www. Hinduism.com, Miles, 2002). The Manu Smiriti, also im-
pels people to spare part of their wealth for the hapless fellow being. In addition the Padma 
Purana, one of the major 18 Hindu religious texts, lists many disabilities and people are 
exorted to care for such people (Miles, 2002). In addition, the Dharmashastra enjoins all 
households to look after the weak and the disabled, promising those who did so their place 
in heaven (Kuppuswamy, 1977).
 13. This is where people are responsible for providing money, or donations in kind such as free 
food, medicine and education, to the poor and needy.
 14. Of course it is true that great disparities in wealth and status also existed in Indian cultures, 
as in the caste system. Our concern here, however, is to trace a countervailing discourse on 
‘pity’ and its origins.
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